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TAKING A DEEPER DIVE INTO PROGRESSIVE 
PROSECUTION: EVALUATING THE TREND 
THROUGH THE LENS OF GEOGRAPHY 
PART TWO: EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS 
MADISON MCWITHEY* 
Abstract: “Progressive prosecution” has injected new life into criminal justice 
reform. This trend, which calls for less punishment, less prosecution of many 
lower-level crimes, and more diversion programs, has taken hold in large cities 
like Philadelphia, Chicago, Boston, and Houston, as well as in smaller rural dis-
tricts. Despite the hype, however, progressive prosecution has its limitations. 
This article discusses four of those limitations and analyzes their effect on pro-
gressive prosecution’s likelihood of success in both urban and rural districts. Alt-
hough many factors constrain progressive prosecution, this article addresses two 
types: internal and external. Part One discusses internal constraints, including the 
traditional motivations of individual prosecutors and prosecutors’ reliance upon 
“line” or assistant prosecutors. Part Two addresses external constraints such as 
the police and availability of resources. Taken together, Parts One and Two em-
phasize that an evaluation of progressive prosecution’s merits must take a nu-
anced, contextual perspective. 
INTRODUCTION 
Across the country, newly-elected progressive prosecutors are striving to 
introduce compassion and nuance into our criminal justice system. But despite 
proponents’ excitement over the movement’s potential, some observers are 
skeptical of the progressive prosecutor’s ability to reach actual results. This 
two-part article analyzes typical prosecutorial constraints through the lens of 
geography to arrive at a more granular assessment of progressive prosecution’s 
likelihood of success. Part One of this article addressed the internal constraints 
a progressive prosecutor faces in her role, including individual prosecutor mo-
tivations and reliance upon line prosecutors. Part Two will analyze two exter-
nal constraints on progressive prosecution: police accountability and availabil-
ity of resources. 
First, a prosecutor’s attempts to hold police accountable for misconduct 
can constrain her ability to carry out progressive policies. All prosecutors rely 
on police officers to arrest suspects, gather evidence, and to serve as key wit-
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nesses in their trials; in short, they cannot do their jobs without the police. But 
many progressive prosecutors have run on platforms that include holding po-
lice accountable for misconduct, which can severely strain the relationship be-
tween the two parties. 
Unlike progressives, traditional prosecutors usually are reluctant to criti-
cize the police, who offer essential endorsements to prosecutors’ electoral 
campaigns.1 When investigating police misconduct, these traditional prosecu-
tors may hide behind the guise of a grand jury to give themselves “political 
cover,” allowing these prosecutors to say they followed through with their con-
stituency’s demands while remaining in favor with the police.2 
In contrast, progressive prosecutors insist on standing up to law enforce-
ment officials by handling these controversial types of cases in a manner that 
ensures greater justice and, at a minimum, impartiality.3 In doing so, however, 
they will likely fail to please both their constituents and the police.4 Without 
votes from the former and cooperation from the latter, progressive prosecutors 
cannot carry out their policies. 
Apart from police misconduct, chief prosecutors simply have limited con-
trol over police officers outside of the courtroom.5 Police officers’ freedom of 
action gives them the power to derail a progressive prosecutor’s agenda. For 
example, a police officer’s decision whether to arrest someone involves a high 
level of discretion.6 If a progressive prosecutor hopes to decriminalize low-
level marijuana possession, he needs police officers to stop arresting individu-
als for that crime. But if a strong police commissioner or the local police union 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Ties That Bind: How the Bond Between Police and Prosecutors Leads to a Conflict of Inter-
est, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/31/ties-that-
bind-conflicts-of-interest-police-killings [https://perma.cc/92ZW-VXNE] [hereinafter Ties That Bind] 
(noting that police disapproval of a DA candidate can be “electorally toxic” because police unions 
endorse 95% of elected DAs). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 25, 
38–39 (2017) (explaining how progressive prosecutors aim to “balance[] three different and often-
conflicting objectives” in police misconduct cases: “independence, accountability, and professional 
competence”). 
 4 See id. (“Protecting all three values simultaneously is difficult.”). 
 5 It’s a Complicated Relationship Between Prosecutors, Police, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED 
(Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/12/04/368529402/its-a-complicated-relationship-between-
prosecutors-police [https://perma.cc/AMZ7-R2AA]. 
 6 See generally Vida B. Johnson, Prosecutors Who Police the Police Are Good People, 87 FORD-
HAM L. REV. ONLINE 13, 16 (2018), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&
context=flro [https://perma.cc/N298-8GFK] (asserting that “the only institution in our criminal justice 
system with more power than police is the prosecutor’s office”); George C. Thomas, III, Discretion 
and Criminal Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Mundane, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (2005) 
(noting that “any system that permits an almost limitless set of decision points for police and prosecu-
tors will be filled with almost limitless discretion”). 
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does not agree with that policy, police officers may continue to arrest individu-
als for possession, thus undermining the progressive prosecutor’s legitimacy.7 
In addition to prosecutors’ relations with police, access to resources such 
as diversion programs and specialty courts can also constrain progressive pros-
ecutorial policies.8 As the pace of criminal justice reform continues to acceler-
ate, progressives have reconceptualized and expanded the role of prosecutors. 
Progressive prosecutors do more than simply churn through cases; they also 
often consider whether an alternative to incarceration is best for a particular 
defendant.9 Resources like diversion programs and specialty courts can give 
offenders a second chance. Yet, implementation of these programs requires 
significant time and money and many districts do not adequately utilize them 
once implemented.10 
I. POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 
A. The Urban Environment 
Police misconduct in the urban setting has led to the election of many 
progressive prosecutors. For example, Chicago constituents elected Kim Foxx 
after police officers murdered seventeen-year-old Laquan McDonald, shooting 
him in the back sixteen times.11 DA Anita Alvarez, Kim Foxx’s predecessor, 
waited to bring charges against the responsible officer until a journalist made 
the tape of the shooting public.12 Foxx defeated Alvarez running on a platform 
of police accountability and justice for those like Laquan McDonald.13 And in 
St. Louis County, Missouri, Wesley Bell challenged incumbent Bob McCul-
loch after a white police officer killed eighteen-year-old Michael Brown in the 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1317 (2012) (describing how 
“police are effectively empowered to decide not only who will be arrested but who will be convict-
ed”); see also Thomas supra note 6, at 1044–45 (discussing the discretionary actions by police offic-
ers that are “essentially un-reviewable,” such as deciding “whether to set up radar on one highway 
versus another” to catch drivers speeding). 
 8 See Elena Schwartz, Do Diversion Programs Really Work?, CRIME REP. (July 3, 2018), https://
thecrimereport.org/2018/07/03/do-jail-diversion-programs-really-work/ [https://perma.cc/ZNF8-7APC] 
(noting that “[a] widespread lack of data about fees, success rates, recidivism, and who is accepted or 
rejected from diversion programs, precludes accountability and improvement almost nationwide”). 
 9 See id. Regrettably, many prosecutors do not take advantage of available programs. Id. For 
example, the ACLU sued Kansas prosecutors for “failing to disclose diversion opportunities to de-
fendants.” Id. The ACLU determined that elected prosecutors in Kansas use these programs in felony 
cases only about 5% of the time. Id. 
 10 Id. (observing that prosecutors currently use diversion programs in just 9% of cases). 
 11 Josie Duffy Rice & Clint Smith, Justice in American Episode 7: The New Progressive Prosecu-
tors?, APPEAL (Sept. 5, 2018), https://theappeal.org/justice-in-america-episode-7-the-new-progressive-
prosecutors/ [https://perma.cc/H6VM-DNJ7]. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. (noting that Foxx has been described as “one of the most progressive prosecutors in the 
nation”). 
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city of Ferguson.14 McCulloch, who had served as the chief prosecutor for al-
most thirty years, lost his bid for reelection to Bell, who decisively won the 
election after promising to pass all future cases of police misconduct to an out-
side, independent prosecutor.15 
Kim Foxx, Wesley Bell, and others like them have pledged to keep the po-
lice accountable. But their efforts are fraught with difficulties. First, such pledges 
typically annoy police unions.16 Lack of support from the local police union can 
be a difficult hurdle to overcome in an election, as voters typically value an en-
dorsement by the police.17 Should a progressive candidate manage to overcome 
lack of police support to win an election, actually delivering on their pledge to 
crack down on police misconduct presents its own set of challenges.18 
Some cities, for example, have promised to investigate cases involving 
police misconduct using special prosecutors from outside the community.19 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Jacob Rosenbert, Can a Prosecutor Ever Truly Be Progressive? Ferguson May Be the Ulti-
mate Test Case, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2019/
04/progressive-prosecutors-ferguson-wesley-bell-kamala-harris-kim-gardener/ [https://perma.cc/LX6S-
A7EX]. 
 15 Samantha Michaels, An Underdog Reformer Just Unseated the Prosecutor Who Handled the 
Ferguson Police Shooting, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-
justice/2018/08/wesley-bell-prosecutor-ferguson-robert-mcculloch/ [https://perma.cc/7PUG-MUH5]. 
Under McCulloch, the grand jury refused to charge the police officer responsible for the Ferguson 
shooting. Astead W. Herndon, Can a Criminal Justice Advocate Unseat Ferguson’s Lead Prosecutor? 
Wesley Bell Will Try, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/07/us/politics/
ferguson-bill-mcculloch-wesley-bell.html [https://perma.cc/QCT5-SLTV]. 
 16 See Phillip Martin, Rachael Rollins Rises to National Stage with Country’s Progressive DAs, 
WGBH NEWS (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.wgbh.org/news/local-news/2019/01/09/rachael-rollins-
rises-to-national-stage-with-countrys-progressive-das [https://perma.cc/3FCP-Z9AA]. Rachael Rollins 
did not have the support of the police during her campaign, largely due to the list of fifteen crimes she 
promised she would “be reluctant to prosecute.” Id. The Boston Police Patrolman’s Association cri-
tiqued the list during the campaign, stating its enforcement would be “dangerous to police.” Id. Before 
Rollins was officially sworn into office, the National Police Association filed an ethics complaint 
against her, citing the list. Radley Balko, Boston’s First Black Woman Prosecutor Has Yet to Take 
Office, but She’s Already Facing an Ethics Complaint, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www-
washingtonpost-com.proxy.bc.edu/opinions/2018/12/28/bostons-first-black-prosecutor-has-yet-take-
office-shes-already-facing-an-ethics-complaint/ [https://perma.cc/L6VQ-K6H5]. 
 17 See Ties That Bind, supra note 1 (discussing the importance of police union support to candi-
dates running for DA). 
 18 The exclusionary rule is a “sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence ob-
tained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011). 
Traditionally, measures such as the exclusionary rule were created to serve as a remedy where police 
break protocols and violate citizens’ rights. See Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through 
Proactive Police Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009). Although the rule’s purpose is to deter police 
officers from committing constitutional violations, it has not been able to “promote wholesale institu-
tional change.” Id. 
 19 See generally Sabrina G. Singer, Embracing Federalism in Special Prosecution Models: An 
Analysis of Experimentation in the States, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 431, 433 ̶ 36, 448–51 
(2018) (defining a special prosecutor as “a lawyer appointed to investigate, and, if justified, seek in-
dictments in a particular case”) (citing Special Prosecutor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019)); Law Signed to Require Independent Investigations of Deaths from Police Force, ACLU N.J. (Jan. 
2020] Progressive Prosecution—Part II I.-53 
Special prosecutors can promote a sense of legitimacy and impartiality that 
local prosecutors may not provide.20 
But not everyone agrees that appointing a special prosecutor is the most 
“progressive” course of action. Some critics believe that progressive prosecu-
tors ought to hold police to the same standards as others that come through 
their courtroom.21 Even though DA’s offices rely on police, the two are inde-
pendent entities. Moreover, police have limited options for retaliation against a 
crusading prosecutor—police, after all, want to keep their jobs. Urban progres-
sive prosecutors, therefore, have the power to stand against the police and 
prosecute misconduct cases on their own turf.22 
Progressive prosecutors’ constituencies may also disapprove of the spe-
cial prosecutor approach.23 Urban populations often have more generalized, 
detached feelings towards the police, as a police department in a large city can 
employ thousands of officers.24 Additionally, studies show that non-white mi-
norities are becoming the majority in urban environments.25 As members of 
minority groups are forced to endure an unequal share of police misconduct, 
urban constituents may feel personally offended if their elected official does 
not stand up to the police herself. These sentiments can lead to overwhelming 
                                                                                                                           
30, 2019), https://www.aclu-nj.org/news/2019/01/30/law-signed-require-independent-investigations-
deaths-police [https://perma.cc/R2ET-QSBZ] (discussing legislation signed in New Jersey that re-
quires a special prosecutor in cases involving police brutality). 
 20 Yet critics of the special prosecutor model cite this level of independence as a major shortcom-
ing. See Singer, supra note 19, at 442, 444. Some critics argue that the discretion given to special 
prosecutors provides ample space for “abuse of unchecked power.” Id. at 445. 
 21 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 17–19 (emphasizing that “to truly be a good person and a good 
prosecutor, a prosecutor must hold police officers accountable”). 
 22 See id. at 16–18 (warning that “at this moment in time prosecutors are the only institutional 
players with the power to check the power of police”). 
 23 See Singer, supra note 19, at 445–47 (discussing that critics of special prosecutors are con-
cerned that their use might “exacerbate[] mistrust” in local authorities). 
 24 See Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Confidence in Police Lowest in 22 Years, GALLUP (June 19, 
2015), https://news.gallup.com/poll/183704/confidence-police-lowest-years.aspx [https://perma.cc/
VLY9-KVM9] (reporting that just 30% of black Americans feel “quite a lot” of confidence in the 
police, compared with 52% among the general population); Charlie Sorrel, People Living in High-
Crime Areas Respect the Law, but Distrust the Police, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.
fastcompany.com/3068921/people-living-in-high-crime-areas-respect-the-law-but-distrust-the-police 
[https://perma.cc/RLH6-6ZVT] (citing the results of a study in which just 23.8% of participants 
“thought the police are honest”); see also William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1969, 1973, 1997–98 (2008) (describing how the “decline of local democratic control over criminal 
justice” in high-crime, urban cities led to professionalized police forces that are “detached from the 
neighborhoods they serve”). 
 25 Kim Parker et al., Demographic and Economic Trends in Urban, Suburban and Rural Commu-
nities, PEW RES. CTR. (May 22, 2018), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/05/22/demographic-
and-economic-trends-in-urban-suburban-and-rural-communities/ [https://perma.cc/K259-9A36]. The 
study reveals that although “the [United States] population remains majority white,” just 44% are 
white in urban areas. Id. The authors note that since 2000, non-Hispanic whites “have become the 
minority in most urban areas.” Id. 
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distrust of a police department and outrage towards a prosecutor who fails to 
adequately handle the misconduct.26 
Aside from difficulties in handling police misconduct, urban progressive 
prosecutors face potential resistance from strong police commissioners and 
unions.27 Police commissioners may not be willing to follow prosecutors’ pro-
gressive policies if they believe that those policies undermine their depart-
ment’s crime-fighting priorities.28 Or if a newly elected DA begins her term by 
pointing out police officers’ inadequate performance, the local union might 
defend its officers’ abilities and present a unified front against the prosecutor.29 
Further, urban police commissioners and other police officials often 
comment on the public safety consequences of the district attorney’s office 
policies. For example, the National Police Association complained about Bos-
ton DA Rachael Rollins to the Massachusetts Bar Association after she re-
leased a list of non-violent crimes that her office has pledged not to prose-
cute.30 Police support can sway the public’s reception of such drastic policy 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See Elias R. Feldman, Strict Tort Liability for Police Misconduct, 53 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 89, 98–100, 102 (2019). The author notes that many scholars attribute the unequal burden 
minority groups face to the “policies and practices of law enforcement” and “unconscious racial bias-
es.” Id. She also discusses the “dignitary injur[ies]” that arise when police officers act on these biases. 
Id. Police brutality towards members of minority groups does not just cause physical injury; there is a 
“separate dignitary injury sustained by all racial minorities” that “stems from the inequity itself.” Id. 
 27 See generally ‘Help Wanted’: Philadelphia Police Union Calling for New District Attorney in 
I-95 Billboard, CBSN PHILLY (June 27, 2019, 5:25 PM), https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2019/06/
27/help-wanted-philadelphia-police-union-calling-for-new-district-attorney-in-i-95-billboards/ [https://
perma.cc/6PZT-V8XD]. The Philadelphia Fraternal Order of Police made their dissatisfaction for DA 
Krasner explicit by paying for two billboards that read, “Help Wanted: New Philadelphia District 
Attorney. Please Contact FOP Lodge #5.” Id. 
 28 Barbara Bean-Mellinger, What Is a Police Commissioner’s Job?, HOUS. CHRON. (Aug. 20, 
2018), https://work.chron.com/police-commissioners-job-25236.html [https://perma.cc/5MG5-LSBC] 
(discussing how police commissioners can be elected or appointed, and that commissioners often “set 
the overall mission and focus” for the department). 
 29 See Dana Branham & Sarah Sarder, Texas Police Union Calls for DA’s Removal Over His Plan 
Not to Prosecute Certain Crimes, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 18, 2019, 4:30 PM), https://www.
dallasnews.com/news/2019/04/18/texas-police-union-calls-for-dallas-da-s-removal-over-his-plan-not-
to-prosecute-certain-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/9UEU-UCUD] (reporting on Texas police union’s dis-
satisfaction with Dallas DA John Creuzot’s policy to “not prosecute certain low-level crimes”); Elyssa 
Cherney, Chicago Police Union President Renews Criticism of Kim Foxx, Says She ‘Needs to Step 
Down’ if She Can’t Do Her Job, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
breaking/ct-met-chicago-union-president-fop-comments-kim-foxx-20190430-story.html [https://perma.
cc/89ES-57XD] (explaining the tumultuous relationship between Chicago DA Kim Foxx and the local 
police union stemming from Foxx’s decision not to prosecute certain crimes); Alicia V. Lozano, Phil-
adelphia District Attorney’s Office Wins Court Battle Against Police Union Over ‘Do Not Call List,’ 
NBC PHILA. (Nov. 22, 2019, 12:02 PM), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/philadelphia-
district-attorneys-office-wins-court-battle-with-police-union/2222588/ [https://perma.cc/3M3C-ABDJ] 
(describing the “fraught” relationship between Philadelphia DA Larry Krasner and the local police 
union that included conflict even before Krasner was elected). 
 30 Kaitlin Flanigan, Police Group Accuses Suffolk DA-Elect of ‘Reckless Disregard’ for Massa-
chusetts Laws, NBC BOS. (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/rachael-rollins-
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changes—a commissioner’s support, especially concerning crimes no longer 
being prosecuted, could be crucial to the policy’s ultimate success.31 On the 
whole, then, progressive prosecutors must strike the delicate balance of hold-
ing the police accountable while not completely alienating them in the process. 
B. The Rural Environment 
Rural progressive prosecutors face different challenges in keeping police 
accountable, such as prosecutors’ personal relationships with police officers. A 
smaller county has fewer officers, so a prosecutor will likely interact with the 
same officer on more than one occasion.32 In fact, a prosecutor in a small 
community might socialize with officers outside of the law enforcement con-
text. An ADA who will likely work with an officer again in the future might be 
reluctant to call them out for conducting an inadequate investigation and risk 
damaging a personal relationship.33 
Although close relationships can provide police with a cloak of protec-
tion, they can also result in personal conflicts that work in a progressive prose-
cutor’s favor. For example, a rural prosecutor faced with a case of police mis-
conduct might feel betrayed or frustrated on a personal level. After all, the 
prosecutor is a member of the community too. That prosecutor may take a 
                                                                                                                           
suffolk-district-attorney-elect-national-police-association-bar-complaint/129098/ [https://perma.cc/
BB67-HNG5]; Eoin Higgins, Progressive DA Rachael Rollins Hasn’t Stopped Prosecuting Petty 
Crimes Despite Pledge, INTERCEPT (Mar. 24, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/03/24/rachael-
rollins-da-petty-crime/ [https://perma.cc/UF94-4XFX]. 
 31 Julie Shaw, Report: DA Krasner “Very Close” to Rolling Out Policy Decriminalizing Drug Pos-
session, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 8, 2019), https://www.philly.com/news/philadelphia-district-attorney-
larry-krasner-drug-possession-20190508.html [https://perma.cc/R5TS-5CY4]. For example, DA Larry 
Krasner has been working on a new policy that would “decriminaliz[e] drug-possession cases.” Id. In 
response to this report, Richard Ross, Philadelphia’s Police Commissioner, commented on the poten-
tial policy. Id. He warned against “blanket policies” but admitted that law enforcement has “no inter-
est in seeing people incarcerated who are addicted to substances that are illegal.” Id. As of December 
2019, the program has started to show results: “drug-possession convictions excluding diversion pro-
grams are down 45%.” Samantha Melamed, Inside Philly DA Larry Krasner’s New Plan to Drop 
Low-Level Drug Charges in Favor of Addiction Treatment, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 3, 2019), https://
www.inquirer.com/news/philadelphia-district-attorney-larry-krasner-drug-diversion-decriminalization-
criminal-justice-reform-20191203.html [https://perma.cc/8TBY-MTN9]. 
 32 Police Employment, Officers Per Capita Rates for U.S. Cities, GOVERNING.COM, https://
www.governing.com/gov-data/safety-justice/police-officers-per-capita-rates-employment-for-city-
departments.html [https://perma.cc/L9ZR-8Y36]. As of 2016, there were over three thousand total 
police officers in Dallas, Texas. Id. Corpus Christi, the largest city in Nueces County, Texas, has only 
445 total officers. Id. 
 33 Michelle Liu, Why One North Mississippi DA Thinks Special Prosecutors Hold the Key in 
Police Shootings, MISS. TODAY (Aug. 20, 2018), https://mississippitoday.org/2018/08/20/why-one-
north-mississippi-d-a-thinks-special-prosecutors-hold-the-key-in-police-shootings/ [https://perma.cc/
F4ST-XRQW]. Mississippi DA Scott Colom has made it a point to create a policy in which all cases 
where “law enforcement officers shoot civilians,” an independent prosecutor takes the case. Id. Colom 
notes that his “five-prosecutor team can’t help but work with law enforcement officials.” Id. 
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more active role in the investigation to make certain the case is not mishan-
dled. Thus, in a close-knit, rural environment, police misconduct has the poten-
tial to hit home in a way that is less common in large, urban environments. 
A rural prosecutor’s constituents can likewise feel a personal connection 
with their police department. Members of a tight-knit rural community may be 
less likely to criticize their police officers, with whom they are likely to have 
personal relationships. A progressive prosecutor can combat this by encourag-
ing increased police accountability on behalf of the entire community.34 But 
unlike prosecutors in the urban environment, rural prosecutors have added in-
centives to pass misconduct cases off to separate entities like special prosecu-
tors; close relationships between prosecutors and the police may be difficult to 
overcome in these situations.35 
Finally, like their urban counterparts, rural prosecutors must work with po-
lice officers to prosecute crimes effectively. Therefore, the same institutional 
concerns apply in each setting. A strong, powerful police commissioner who op-
poses progressive ideas can threaten a rural progressive prosecutor’s agenda. In 
that scenario, rural prosecutors must find a level of cooperation with police. Oth-
erwise, a resentful police force may work to undermine the prosecutor’s office. 
II. AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES 
A. The Urban Environment 
Progressive prosecutors have expanded the role of the prosecutor. In addi-
tion to their primary duty of prosecuting cases, prosecutors engage with their 
communities, help offenders get their lives on track, and even help prevent 
crime from happening in the first place.36 But establishing programs to tackle 
these new responsibilities requires significant resources. 
Such programs are on the rise, particularly in urban areas, which are more 
likely to have resources available to fund them.37 Since 2007, for example, 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Id. 
 35 Id.; Nick Tabor, What if Prosecutors Wanted to Keep People Out of Prison?, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 
27, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/03/what-if-prosecutors-wanted-to-keep-people-out-of-
prison.html [https://perma.cc/VLA4-E259]. Scott Colom commented that prosecutors “have to work 
too closely for there to be independence” in police misconduct cases, “[e]specially in rural communi-
ties.” Id. He previously asked the State Attorney General’s office to get involved in a police miscon-
duct case out of his concern for impartiality. Id. 
 36 See Kristine Hamann & Laura Greenberg-Chao, The Prosecutor’s Evolving Role, PROSECU-
TOR, Jan. 2018, at 14, 30 (discussing recent initiatives including “juvenile diversion programs,” 
“community engagement,” and “neighborhood courts”). 
 37 See Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal 
Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1605 (2012) (citing the existence of “approximately 3,000 specialized crim-
inal courts in the United States”); Texas Specialty Courts, OFF. TEX. GOVERNOR (July 16, 2019), 
gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/organization/criminal-justice/Specialty-Courts-By-County.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M8PY-P4BU] (contrasting the number of specialty courts in urban and rural Texas). Most 
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Texas has increased the number of specialty courts from nine to 177.38 In Dal-
las County, there are twenty-two.39 In contrast, rural Nueces County has only 
four.40 The number of alternatives to incarceration available can increase an 
individual defendant’s chance of receiving some type of aid from one of these 
programs.41 
Progressive prosecutors who seek to expand the use of these programs 
may face resistance from line prosecutors. An ADA usually has discretion 
when deciding whether to give a defendant the option of entering into a diver-
sion program rather than serving time in jail.42 This is a heavy burden for line 
prosecutors, who often have little background or experience in social work or 
psychology. Because busy chief prosecutors are unlikely to review all of their 
ADA’s activities, line prosecutors’ decision making can affect the success of 
these programs.43 
Urban offices have sought to maximize the effectiveness of diversion 
programs by acknowledging the burden on line prosecutors. For example, in 
Maricopa County, Arizona, County Attorney Bill Montgomery created the Di-
version Program Bureau to improve the county’s diversion programs.44 To en-
                                                                                                                           
specialized courts focus on crimes involving drugs and usually offer treatment as an alternative to prison. 
Id. In Texas, there has been an effort to introduce a new type of specialty court exclusive to “law en-
forcement officers, firefighters, prison guards, and paramedics charged with any misdemeanor or felony 
. . . who suffer from a brain injury, mental illness or a mental disorder . . . that they got from their job.” 
Jolie McCullough, Some Counties Question Need of Special Courts for Law Enforcement, TEX. TRIB. 
(July 3, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/07/03/texas-specialty-courts-police/ 
[https://perma.cc/58ZQ-22EB]. Critics believe that these courts might “further divide the community 
from police officers.” Id. 
 38 Rick Perry, Follow the Texas Model, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.
brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/follow-texas-model [https://perma.cc/487Q-ZRAH]; 
Texas Specialty Courts, supra note 37. These specialty courts range in their focus area, but the most 
common are drug and mental health courts. Texas Specialty Courts, supra note 37. The 177 courts 
also include veterans court, family court, commercially sexually exploited persons court, and juvenile 
court. Id. 
 39 Texas Specialty Courts, supra note 37. 
 40 Id. 
 41 But leaders advocating for these types of programs believe that they are currently “vastly un-
derutilized” and “inaccessible to low-income defendants.” Schwartz, supra note 8. Prosecutors across 
the United States divert only 9% of felony cases. Id. 
 42 Mary Fan, Street Diversion and Decarceration, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 181 (2013) (stating 
that “prosecutors are the central gatekeepers, wielding broad discretion over whether defendants get 
pretrial diversion”); Rick Jones, From the President: See No Evil: Prosecution and Unchecked Discre-
tion, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW., https://www.nacdl.org/Article/January-February2018-Fromthe
PresidentSeeNoEvilPros [https://perma.cc/Q9VG-YMNS] (discussing the “wide discretion” that “the 
criminal justice systems extends [to] prosecutors”). 
 43 And even more so for “absolutist” prosecutors who demonstrate a “commitment to rules, struc-
ture, and hardened categories of right and wrong.” Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, Career Moti-
vations of State Prosecutors, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1668, 1681 (2018). 
 44 Amanda Jacinto, Redefining Wins and Losses: Further Enhancing the Prosecutor Playbook, 
PROSECUTOR, Apr. 2018, at 10. Jacinto states that this program is an “investment in crime reduction,” 
which is exactly what progressive prosecution is all about. Id. at 11. Maricopa County, Arizona has a 
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act his vision, Montgomery asked Patricia Cordova, a former human services 
professional with no prosecutorial experience, to be the Bureau’s chief.45 Cor-
dova works alongside the county’s line prosecutors to influence and become a 
part of the pre-trial decision-making process.46 In Philadelphia, DA Larry 
Krasner has launched a police-assisted program that allows for police officers 
to participate in the diversion effort early on in the criminal justice process.47 
Instead of arresting someone struggling with a drug addiction, for example, 
officers have the option to place the individual in a community-based treat-
ment facility.48 The city of Philadelphia has budgeted $750,000 for this pro-
gram annually, as part of a larger six-million dollar initiative to decrease the 
city’s jail population over the course of three years.49 
These programs aid prosecutors by delegating decision-making power to 
others. In Maricopa County, for example, prosecutors considering diversion 
programs can consult with a professional who specializes in working with the 
prison population.50 And by recruiting police officers to take part in pretrial 
diversion, fewer offenders may come through the system, which lightens a 
prosecutor’s caseload and permits more individuals to receive the type of help 
that they need.51 Urban progressive prosecutors have the luxury of leading 
                                                                                                                           
population of over 4.4 million. Quick Facts, Marciopa County, Arizona, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/maricopacountyarizona/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/
2WYU-9DSF]. The county includes Arizona’s capital, Phoenix, the fifth most populous city in the 
United States. US City Populations 2019, WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulationreview.
com/us-cities/ [https://perma.cc/N949-FW68]. 
 45 Jacinto, supra note 44, at 10. 
 46 Id. at 11. Cordova serves as an invaluable resource to line prosecutors by offering trainings and 
helping them understand “when and how” to advocate for a diversion program. Id. 
 47 Kelly Cofrancisco, City Announces Police-Assisted Diversion (PAD) to Fight Opioid Epidemic, 
CITY OF PHILA. (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.phila.gov/2018-03-16-city-announces-police-assisted-
diversion-pad-to-fight-opioid-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/B3V6-CEWD]; see also Tom MacDonald, 
Philadelphia Going “Outside the Box” with Diversion Program, WHYY (Mar. 16, 2018), https://
whyy.org/articles/philadelphia-going-outside-box-diversion-program/ [https://perma.cc/LYA9-8Z29] 
(reporting that under the police-assisted diversion program, an individual could be given up to two 
changes to be rehabilitated, but that a third offense would result in prosecution). 
 48 Cofrancisco, supra note 47. 
 49 Id.; Katie Colaneri, $3.5 Million Grant to Help Philly Cut Inmate Population, Launch Other 
Prison Reforms, WHYY (Apr. 13, 2016), https://whyy.org/articles/35-million-grant-to-help-philly-cut-
inmate-population-launch-other-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/3LYK-79WN]. Compare this figure to the 
$4 million budget of the Nueces County, Texas prosecutor’s office led by DA Mark Gonzalez. Justin 
Jouvenal, From Defendant to Top Prosecutor, This Tattooed Texas DA Represents a New Wave in 
Criminal Justice Reform, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
public-safety/from-defendant-to-top-prosecutor-this-tattooed-texas-da-represents-a-new-wave-in-
criminal-justice-reform/2018/11/19/e1dca7cc-d300-11e8-83d6-291fcead2ab1_story.html/e1dca7cc-
d300-11e8-83d6-291fcead2ab1_story.html [https://perma.cc/22JC-YK7W]. 
 50 Jacinto, supra note 44, at 10. 
 51 See generally Cofrancisco, supra note 47. 
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large-scale, collaborative efforts with big budgets to fund them.52 As long as 
individual prosecutors are given the proper tools to assist with diversion, these 
types of programs can put a lot of defendants through proper treatment rather 
than sending them to prison. 
B. The Rural Environment 
Despite the limited resources of rural district attorney’s offices, progres-
sive prosecutors have still managed to implement successful diversion pro-
grams. Because fewer individuals come through the system in these smaller 
offices, a large variety of programs is not necessary. Progressive prosecutors 
can make an impact with a smaller number of diversion programs by focusing 
on certain low-level offenses and working with specific offenders on a more 
individualized basis. 
Rural progressive prosecutors across the country are expanding these pro-
grams. For example, Scott Colom, Mississippi’s Sixteenth Circuit Court DA, 
doubled the defendants participating in a pre-trial diversion program to 218 in 
his first year in office.53 As long as a defendant secures employment or attends 
school while remaining sober, the office will consider dropping the charges.54 
The program is led by a former social worker who has the professional back-
ground to assist defendants in finding the type of rehabilitation services or 
schooling they need to succeed.55 Colom funded the treatment for individuals in 
the program using a combination of court fees, fines and Medicaid.56 
In his past two years in office, Nueces County, Texas DA Mark Gonzalez 
has funneled nearly 2,600 defendants away from jails and into similar pro-
grams.57 Gonzalez’s diversion programs sought to target defendants dealing 
with substance abuse or those who could benefit from domestic violence train-
ing.58 Defendants that participate in the Nueces County marijuana possession 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See Colaneri, supra note 49 (discussing Philadelphia’s diversion efforts); Lucas Manfield, 
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 53 Tabor, supra note 35. 
 54 Id. 
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 56 Steve Rogers, Achieving Some of Goals, DA Says, DAILY TIMES LEADER (May 18, 2018), https://
www.dailytimesleader.com/content/achieving-some-goals-da-says [https://perma.cc/UY8N-W3RR]. 
 57 Jouvenal, supra note 49. 
 58 Eleanor Dearman, Nueces County District Attorney Makes Mark After Year in Office, CORPUS 
CHRISTI CALLER TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018, 1:10 AM), https://www.caller.com/story/news/local/2018/02/
09/nueces-county-district-attorney-makes-mark-after-year-office/1079849001/ [https://perma.cc/M94F-
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program, for example, must pay a $250 fine and complete a mandatory drug 
class.59 The programs have generated over $700,000 in revenue, which is then 
invested back into diversion and also used to fund county employees’ salaries.60 
The success of these programs demonstrates that progressive prosecution 
does not require endless resources to improve the criminal justice system. 
Smaller programs that offer individualized attention to defendants can quickly 
increase a county’s rehabilitation rate. Also, progressive prosecutors can take 
advantage of the ad hoc nature of rural courthouses, which may be more will-
ing to treat defendants as individuals than large, overburdened urban courts.61 
In this setting, one or two carefully tailored programs may be just as effective 
as the wide array offered in large cities. 
As in the urban environment, though, line prosecutors may pose a threat 
to the success of diversion programs in rural counties. Prosecutors in the rural 
environment do not necessarily have the skill set of a social worker, which 
would help them know when a particular defendant may be a good fit for a 
certain program. Due to the nature of the rural area, however, prosecutors in 
these offices are more likely to work on finding collaborative solutions and ask 
for help from other players in the system.62 Progressive chief prosecutors are 
more available to their staff in these areas and can assure that their line prose-
cutors gain some of the knowledge needed to be successful in pursuing diver-
sion programs for defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
This two-part article analyzes the obstacles to successful progressive 
prosecution in a fresh light. Admittedly, progressive prosecutors face many 
restraints beyond the four discussed in this article. Instead of providing a com-
                                                                                                                           
L8A5] (“[Gonzalez implemented] programs for [charges stemming from] marijuana possession, driv-
ing with an invalid license, driving while intoxicated and first-time offender domestic violence cas-
es.”). The program for first-time offenders of domestic violence has been controversial. Jouvenal, 
supra note 49. During Gonzalez’s first year in office, only two men were enrolled in the program, and 
prosecutors dismissed a majority of domestic violence cases. Id. In April 2018, Gonzalez acknowl-
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 59 Carimah Townes, Is Mark Gonzalez the Reformer He Promised to Be?, APPEAL (Nov. 21, 
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activism/marijuana-laws-and-penalties-in-texas/ [https://perma.cc/6GJN-AP3K]. 
 60 Dearman, supra note 58; Jouvenal, supra note 49. 
 61 See Elizabeth R. Gebert, Challenges Facing Rural Prosecutors, PROSECUTOR, Sept. 2018, at 
11 (describing how the limited resources in rural areas require stakeholders to pursue “unorthodox” 
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 62 See id. 
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prehensive overview of all such issues, however, this article demonstrates the 
need for nuanced, context-dependent treatment of these limitations. 
Part One demonstrated that rural progressive prosecutors are in a better 
position than their urban counterparts to surmount internal constraints. Part 
Two’s analysis of external constraints does not allow for such a neat conclu-
sion. The innately dependent relationship prosecutors have with the police is a 
hindrance to progressive prosecution regardless of where it takes place. Urban 
progressive prosecutors in large offices face potential backlash from their con-
stituents for appointing special prosecutors to handle police misconduct cases. 
Progressives who instead personally handle such cases risk alienating police, 
without whom prosecutors cannot do their jobs effectively. In the rural envi-
ronment, the personal relationships between prosecutors and police create their 
own set of difficulties. And in both the urban and rural settings, tough-on-
crime police commissioners may simply refuse to cooperate with progressive 
policies. 
On the other hand, both the urban and rural environments provide great 
opportunities for progressive prosecution through alternatives to incarceration. 
Although urban offices have bigger budgets, thus permitting implementation of 
more diversion programs, prosecutors in the rural environment can focus on 
defendants at an individual level, and help get them the treatment they need to 
be successfully rehabilitated. The ad hoc nature of rural courthouses also gives 
these prosecutors greater opportunities to divert offenders and create a more 
balanced approach in handling cases. 
These conclusions suggest that progressive prosecution cannot always 
produce successful and just results, and that is not good enough. Even though 
these new players entering the criminal justice scene have created high hopes for 
change, it is unlikely that the innate, institutional failures can be fixed without a 
complete revamp of the system. The injustice that occurs every day to criminal 
defendants in courtrooms across the nation cannot be tolerated. 
But the spirit of progressive prosecution means fitting within the estab-
lished confines and to ‘do better.’ Prosecutors are supposed to serve as leaders 
in promoting justice, but until that becomes a reality, the amount of discretion 
prosecutors wield should be diverted among a greater group of individuals. 
One change that could easily be implemented in DA’s offices, particularly in 
the urban environment, is to hire social workers to serve on cases alongside 
line prosecutors. Social workers have the necessary background to evaluate 
defendants in a more nuanced light and could help ensure that a progressive 
touch is added in tough cases. Big cities already have hefty, million-dollar 
budgets and the resources to hire a social worker for each division. Social 
workers will likely align with progressive prosecution values and provide help-
ful insight into diversion efforts while lightening the load for overworked line 
prosecutors. 
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District attorneys have the highest privilege of representing the constituents 
that elected them into office. The burden progressive prosecution places on 
traditional DAs offices is heavy, and it may seem unfair to make prosecu-
tors adapt and fit into an influx system. Unfortunately, however, their 
‘crime-fighting’ attitudes are largely the reason why such a change is neces-
sary in the first place. At the very least, the charge led by progressive prose-
cutors can challenge the traditional mindset and achieve greater justice for 
criminal defendants. 
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